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Abstract: In her paper "Between Subjection and Dispossession: Butler’s Recent Performative Thought
on Foucault’s Latest Work," Elisa Cabrera argues that Butler's latest works on public assemblies aim to
constitute a collective subject based on vulnerability and interdependence as a guiding principle. This
objective is possible, only through the dual action of the subject's dispossession, which implies the loss
of recognition within a certain regime of truth on one hand, yet the gain of becoming an interdependent
and relational being on the other. To reach this conclusion, this paper will address Michel Foucault's later
works on "regimes of truth" On the Government of the living (1980) and the Dartmouth and Berkeley
Conferences (1980) and how these lectures, which are centered on the shift of Western subjectivity in
primitive Christianity, are interpreted by Butler in a very new sense. This interpretation allows her to
develop a new theory on dispossession and collective performativity.
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Elisa CABRERA
From Subjection to Dispossession: Butler’s Recent Performative Thought on Foucault’s
Latest Work
In her recent work, the philosopher Judith Butler has continued to consider possible configurations of
the political subject. Butler proposes a model that is no longer merely composed of the historic conditions
and the regulatory framework, which establish the forms of governmentality concerned with said model,
but is also based on a critical investigation of these social conditions that constantly interpellate a
community of subjects. Added to this is the process of loss resulting from the critical investigation of
the subject who derives from one or another regulatory framework. According to our hypothesis, this
notion of critique of oneself as auto-constitution on one hand, and dispossession on the other is derived
from the importance that philosophy has placed in recent years on the task of composing a genealogy
of western subjectivity; a task that would go on to play a central role in Michel Foucault’s work from the
1980s. We must specify that this venture was, according to Foucault’s own statements in 1982, the key
point that served as the founding meaning in all his work, and not only in the research carried out over
the last four years. "My objective [Foucault points out in "The Subject and Power"] has been to create
a history of the different modes by which, in our culture, human beings are made subjects (326). In
order to do so, Foucault redefines a conceptual tool in “The political function of the intellectual” (1976),
the regimes of truth (El origen, 69-70, editors’ note, trans. is ours ).
This investigation centers on the hypothesis that, based on such readings and analyses of Foucault’s
latest proposals in relation to the regimes of truth – the lecture courses and conferences that Foucault
delivered during the 1980s, such as the conferences at Dartmouth and Berkeley with the material
developed in the course On the Government of the Living – the notions of truth become more relevant
in the work of Judith Butler. These notions of truth, from the regimes of truth or veridiction and of truthtelling, therefore make possible a shift from how philosophy understands the process of subjectivation;
a process which is, simultaneously, constitutive and dispossessing. With this, so-called “constitutive
loss” Butler finds a conceptual tool that enables her to think a collective critical subject when faced with
the requisite of the subject’s truth-telling, as we intend to demonstrate.
For this reason, Foucault’s latest works have become more relevant to the study of subjectivation
and political agency of the subjects and collectives; all of which is clearly visible in Butler’s latest
contributions, in which the processes of subjectivation are developed in a novel way under the prism of
dispossession. This being the case, I will dedicate the first part of this article to a brief presentation of
the notions that Foucault develops in relation to the regimes of truth and the connection that binds them
to hegemony and to the governmentality forms. Additionally, we will compare constituents of the models
of Greek, Latin, and Christian subjectivation. This question is central to the lecture courses On the
government of the living and The hermeneutics of the subject. Secondly, we will define the conceptual
distances that separate the Foucauldian model of subjection and renunciation that originate from the
practices of primitive Christianity and Judith Butler’s re-reading of these practices in her latest works.
With this definition established, we will introduce the figure of dispossession, one that is decisive in our
author’s considerations. The relationality implicit to dispossession leads to the essay’s concluding
observation, that is Butler’s desire to configure a collective subject based on the core ideas of
vulnerability, precariousness and interdependence. This is best exemplified by the activist forms of
public assemblies, which the American philosopher has recently paid particular attention to.
The 1980s, the final decade of Foucault’s life and oeuvre, marked a of methodological shift in his
philosophy which resulted in a series of new elements that have yet to be fully explored. In fact, for
the first time in Foucauldian thought, there is an exhaustive explanation of the “regimes of truth” in
their ultimate meaning throughout the Collège de France lecture course in 1980, On the Government of
the Living, which is still not widely read having only recently being published in French in 2012, in
English in 2014, and in Spanish in 2016. This series of lectures forms a working genealogy of the western
subject’s obedience, which began with the practice of penitence, dating back to the first centuries of
Christianity. During this period, the Early Church Fathers did not only develop their religious thought,
but they also documented the corporal punishment practices which were progressively instated in the
monasteries, forming the basis of western penitence. From his study of Tertuliano and Casiano, amongst
others, Foucault concludes that primitive Christianity established "the set of processes and institutions
by which, under certain conditions and with certain effects, individuals are bound and obliged to make
well-defined truth acts" (On the Government, 94). In other words, a new need arose among individuals
to “show how they really are.” In this way, Foucault compares this type of demonstration of oneself with
the ancient Graeco-latin conscientious, which seeks to assure self-control through an examination of
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actions. Such is the case of Seneca or Pythagoras. Contrarily, in primitive Christianity we discover a
more complex relationship with oneself and with others, bound to subjection and to subjectivation,
bound to debt and obedience. This bond between the subjection and subjectivation resulted in an
asymmetry between what the subject itself produces and represents on the one hand, and on the other,
processes by which one’s subjectivity is always defined and produced by different techniques of
subjection (Cresmonesi et al., Foucault and the Making 2). Through his exhaustive studies of said model
of subjectivity introduced through primitive Christianity, Foucault sought to demonstrate the existence
of a particular pattern from which the current way of constructing subjectivity derives. This pattern was
reproduced, according to Foucault, based on the techniques of confession and behavior control carried
out by primitive Christians, and later secularized by means of the modern arts of governmentality:
psychiatry apparatus, medicine and judicial power (8) "A transformation – says the Frenchman – which
came about at the beginning of the Christian era, the age of Christianity, when the obligation to know
oneself became the monastic precept” (Foucault, El origen 46).
We should take into account that, in the first pages of the lecture course, Foucault himself declares
a relational shift from his previous analytic framework, the notion of knowledge-power (On the
Government 10). This shift is directed towards the existing relationship between the modes of
governmentality and the expression of truth. With this shift, in the lecture course of 1980, Foucault
restructures his analytic framework and focuses on the processes and the objectives of a particular
subject bound to a manifestation of a concrete truth, beginning, as previously mentioned, a new form
of analysis of the constitution of the subject that links governmental exercise to a “pure manifestation
of truth” (5). In that sense, for Foucault, as he explains, "passing from the notion of knowledge-power
to that of government by the truth essentially involves giving a positive and differentiated content to
these two terms of knowledge and power" (12). Foucault goes on to identify this action with the Greek
word alethourgés, meaning what is true. Yet more importantly, without this expense of truth-telling,
power cannot be demonstrated (7). Each demonstration of power we want to analyze comes with a
series of practices, of possible procedures to generate a truth, a ritual, to which Foucault attributes the
self-coined word aleturgia, derived from alethourgés (7). With this term, Foucault seeks to depict "the
set of possible verbal or non-verbal procedures by which one brings to light what is laid down as true
as opposed to false" (7). Furthermore, Foucault pauses to reflect on how in classic Greek language,
“hegemony” represents "the fact of being in the position of leading others, of driving them and, in a
way, their behaviour" (7). And for Foucault, said hegemony seems not to be able to manifest itself with
an aleturgia. It is the knot that ties hegemony and aleturgia which allows for the condition of possibility
of the “regime of truth,” in the interaction between domination techniques and techniques of the self.
In the same year, Foucault announced a series of conferences in Dartmouth and Berkeley on the
material studied in On the Government of the Living, in which he would present the conclusions that
allowed him to access the readings and to analyze the lecture course. In fact, just as the conferences
editors of the first French edition (2013) stated, the philosopher renewed the ideas that were formed
and developed in Security, Territory, Population on power techniques and practices of resistance.
Quoting the editors, in Foucault "the government is the point of contact whereby the way in which
individuals are led by others is expressed in the same way in which they conduct themselves and
precisely by means of this definition of the government as an ’unstable balance [...] between the
techniques employed in the coercion and processes through which the self is constructed or modified by
one’s own works’, Foucault opens the conceptual space in which he centers his project on a genealogy
of the modern western subject (El origen, 22)".
In this way, when we try to form an idea of the way in which a subject is put together, for Foucault
it is essential "to consider the instances in which the technologies of domination of some individuals
over others calls for processes by means of which the individual acts on themself; and vice versa, the
instances in which the techniques of the self are integrated into structures of coercion and domination"
(El origen, 45). This is only possible by maintaining close attention to this bond that, on one hand, binds
the exercise of power, the leading of others and hegemony, and on the other ties the procedures of
truth demonstration and aleturgia; this essential tie between the governing of others, loss, and the
possibility that such a loss gives way to the inversion of constituting relationships of power through the
other that supports the subjectivity of the rest. Put in another way, "the always-present potentiality of
the subjects to alter, unsettle and invent the power relations they are shaped by is not the side effect
of techniques of subjection but, on the contrary, their very condition of possibility" (Cresmonesi et al.
Foucault and the Making 2).
Previously, we stated that Butler has paid particular attention to the problem of “the truth” and the
regimes of truth. Furthermore, and in the same sense, we must highlight that on numerous occasions
the Butlerian concept that the “the 'I' has no story of its own that is not also the story of a relation—or
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set of relations—to a set of norms" (Butler, Giving 8), has been attacked with particular critique arguing
that such a statement would suggest the incapacity of the subject to exercise or initiate an agency and
a moral responsibility (8). Nevertheless, for the philosopher, such a conclusion is deemed invalid in as
much that, it is precisely this “dispossession” that can be the founding condition for the start of a social
uproar, and even the beginning itself of a criticism although "The ‘I’ is always to some extent
dispossessed by the social conditions of its emergence" (8).
Already by the year 2000, Foucault’s studies on normative regimes were generating questions for
Butler about a subject constituted of these very “formations and delimitations” and of the “stage for
action” (Butler, Judith Butler Reader, 306) which presupposes a collective governed by these norms. In
her essay "What is Critique? An Essay on Foucault's virtue" Butler suggests that Foucault’s probing into
the “construction of the self and the poiesis” is the nucleus of a Foucauldian proposal regarding the
politics of desubjection: “Paradoxically, self-making and desubjection happen simultaneously when a
mode of existence is risked which is unsupported by what he calls the regime of truth (306). In this
way, for Butler the construction of the self implies carrying out a criticism when a life form does not
become intelligible in the regime of truth whose intention is to continually subjectivize this life form. The
critique then, would be that practice which "bring into relief the very framework of evaluation itself"
(307). In other words, Foucault’s critique is, according to Butler, what allows the subject to realize that
they are constituted under a regime of truth on one hand, and to carry out a desubjection from this
regime on the other, given that there are always possibilities to alternatively ordering the social life,
“and it is from this condition, the tear in the fabric of our epistemological web, that the practice of
critique emerges, with the awareness that no discourse is adequate here or that our reigning discourses
have produced an impasse” (308).
Previously, in The Psychic Life of Power (1997) Butler was considering the possibility of a "constitutive
loss" of the subject (92) whilst the subject becomes aware of its subjection to power and narrates it:
"The subject loses itself to tell the story of itself, but in telling the story of itself seeks to give an account
of what the narrative function has already made plain" (11). This work lays out the main problems the
philosopher will contend with in later decades. These problems include how the subject acts its
subjectivity as it is acted upon by power, and how this implies a dispossession of the subject of itself by
acting in power: "Power not only acts on a subject but, in a transitive sense, enacts the subject into
being. As a condition, power precedes the subject" (13). However, here she hadn't had any contact with
Foucault's texts about Regimes of Truth that, from our point of view, were later the key tool that allowed
her to think about dispossession as a collective constitutive loss, as we shall see below.
In short, leading up to the year 2000 the politics of truth were already thoroughly integrated in
Butler’s thought, though it would take another decade to come up with a dispossessed subject in its
dual meaning, which we have mentioned, as in the collectivized sense that began to unfold in the 2010s.
This makes us question if it is possible to speak of two moments in the philosophical work of Judith
Butler in relation to the constitution of the subject: one more attached to the texts of Foucault, whereby
the desubjection marks the contingency and the transformability of the subject, and another, more
personal moment in which, based on her works of vulnerability and precariousness, she conceives a
dispossessed subject? Butler recovers this “singular sense of poeisis” (Judith Butler Reader 320), of
making/constructing/creating the Foucauldian "arts of existence” in order to attribute them with a new
plural dimension which would be demonstrated in critical practices and artistic collectives.
This leads us to consider together with Butler: “under what conditions does self-poiesis become a
relational category?” (Athanasiou and Butler, Dispossession 67). In Giving an account of oneself (2005),
the philosopher’s repeated recovery of the regimes of truth appears to be closely related to another of
the fundamental concerns of her entire philosophical work on subjectivity, the process of recognition:
"the regime of truth offers a framework for the scene of recognition, delineating who will qualify as a
subject of recognition and offering available norms for the act of recognition" (22). That is, on the one
hand, the regime of truth sets the norms, in relation to which a subject constructs themself, by
questioning the very same “self” in relation to such norms. On the other hand, however, the mere
existence of this framework does not imply fixity in the understanding it establishes, "deterministically"
(22), as Butler would say. But conversely, the fact of being established, with respect to a process, allows
one to question and transform the norms that govern understanding in one way or another; “to call into
question a regime of truth, where that regime of truth governs subjectivation, is to call into question
the truth of myself [...]” (23). In this critique of the norms of recognition, that constitute a self-criticism
given that the subject would be constituted by them, and thus derived from the process of selfconstitution, Butler identifies a specific movement of “dispossession”: "What price is paid here, when
the account that himself he is able to give is indebted to being dominated by others and by their
discourse?" (124). In other words, by showing a truth, and doing so by conforming to it, or being
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governed by a certain regime of truth, we leave something along the way: "In Foucault, it seems, there
is a price for telling the truth about oneself, precisely because what constitutes the truth will be framed
by norms and by specific modes of rationality that emerge historically” (121). This account of oneself,
this self-reflection, is never initiated autonomously, but rather with the appearance of an inquiry of the
rationality forms established in this regime of truth, which are presented "as an incitement, a form of
seduction, an imposition or demand from outside to which one yields" (125). As part of this resignation,
which may seem to lead us to a dead-end, the second movement of “dispossession” of the subject
comes into play, given that the loss, or the cost, is what transforms the subject into an interdependent
and relational being. According to Butler, the subject is used by the norm within a socially established
model; the norm uses the me to the same extent that I use it in “a sociability that exceeds me” (36)
and:
If it is an account of myself, and it is an accounting to someone, then I am compelled to give the
account away, to send it off, to be dispossessed of it at the very moment that I establish it as my
account. No account takes place outside the structure of address, even if the addressee remains implicit
and unnamed, anonymous and unspecified. The address establishes the account as an account, and so
the account is completed only on the occasion when it is effectively exported and expropriated from the
domain of what is my own. It is only in dispossession that I can and do give any account of myself. (3637)
Dispossession therefore appears in the form of critical knowledge about ourselves, a “selfquestioning” which does, in fact, put us at risk (38). What is at stake? We risk our ability to be recognised
by the regime of truth in which we are immersed, which normatively constitutes our subjectivity, the
possibility of recognition as valid subjects within the regime, within the intelligibility framework.
However, in Foucault, the author notes, “the price is the suspension of the critical relation to the truth
regime in which we live (Butler, Giving an account 122). In other words, would we lose our critical
capacity, ‘our critical relation’ with the truth, to manifest this truth under a set normalizing regime to
which we should adjust in order to comply with its requisites? Here we discover a fundamental point of
divergence between our two authors; while Foucault reveals the loss of the critical relation on having to
“adapt” to the regime, Butler shows this loss to be the gain of the critical relation in the discussion on
the truth itself as something that does not adapt to the regime of truth.
It is by no means accidental that we use the term “framework” as a concept that is homologous with
the regime of truth. In 2009, Butler published Frames of War, a title in which she uses the notion of
"framework" to refer to the regimes of truth that are established in war zones, which deny certain
precarious lives within this framework the recognition of subjectivity, in as much that the purpose of the
framework "is, clearly, to outline the sphere of appearance itself" (1), that is, to confine the recognition.
Frames of War centers its analysis on the precarious body as a deconstructive tool of agency. Just as
for Butler, "the body is exposed to socially and politically articulated forces as well as to claims of
sociality [...] that make the body's persisting and flourishing possible" (3), the vulnerability of the body
–making it something precarious, in the sense of fragility and instability— is what attributes it with
agency, but also with responsibility for the rest of the vulnerable bodies in relation to its own:
"Precariousness implies living socially, that is, the fact that one's life is always, in a sense, in the hands
of the other" (14). Further, when we are faced with social systems that strengthen models of
“responsibilization” that appeal for a process of production for self-sufficient individuals (60), Butler’s
proposal opens itself up to a “responsibilization” in an opposing sense. Faced with regimes of truth that
call for individuation more and more, only one proposal that centers on the “we” as a vulnerable subject
would be capable of deconstructing the framework of intelligibility that the regimes of truth, from the
current post-Fordist model of production, instate. Such reflections, along with Butler, bring into
question: "how we might rethink the 'we' in global terms in ways that counter the politics of imposition"?
(Frames 38).
On the basis of this search as a premise, the philosopher develops her subsequent works placing the
interrelational subject in a central position. In Dispossession, her published conversations with the Greek
philosopher Athena Altanasiou, Butler instigates with the hypothesis that the movement of subject
dispossession is what permits both recognition and agency. It is dispossession that makes possible the
encounter with otherness by revealing the limits of the self-sufficient subject and showing the
dispossessed subject to be vulnerable. Thus, we can see how, on the one hand, dispossession grants
agency to the interdependent subject yet on the other it makes the subject vulnerable when put up
against a normalizing regime of truth. Despite the phrase making vulnerable seeming to be something
undesirable, it is precisely this notion that allows the philosopher to constitute a new model of collective
political subjectivity. The authors problematize this seemingly disjunctive space in which the
performativity of the norms that establish the regimes of truth produces and models us based on the
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same norms. However, on the contrary, “the possibility of critical invocation and resignification of the
normalized order remains open” (127). In fact, the philosopher believes that sociability can be
understood under this “equation” in two ways, "First, the norms against which we struggle are social
norms, and they govern us precisely as social creatures. Second, we make ourselves, if we do, with
others, and only on the condition that there are forms of collectivity that are struggling against the
norms in similar or convergent ways" (67).
In this sense, Butler returns her attention to Foucault and to self-care, which is understood as a form
of poiesis (69). Thus, this poietic “self” which acts despite being fully aware of the loss that such acting,
or self-recognition entails, invades the framework of intelligibility – such “general historical schema or
schemas that establish spheres of the intelligible" (Frames 6) – in order to start to deconstruct it,
revealing a new space for manifestation and reclaiming a new regime of recognition: "The 'I' articulated,
claimed or defended by those dispossessed of self-determination – those constituted as an impropriety
– bears the burden and the responsibility of injurious and unjust genealogies alongside its aspirations
to freedom” (Dispossession 99). Once again, we come across the double figure of dispossession in
terms of relationability, in terms of avowal. "Avowal is a scene of address" [added emphasis] ("Wrongdoing" 84), a scene in which new narratives are possible and desirable.
At this stage, one might question: What role do the primitive Christian practices of exomologesis
play in this critical task? In what way are the Christian practices of exomologesis important to Butler?
Undoubtedly, we believe they are important in a performative sense. Let us return for a moment to
Giving an account of oneself. Butler suggests practicing, according to the terms put forward by Foucault
relating to the constitution of the subject during primitive Christianity, a contemporary “reconsideration”
of said subject or perhaps, of the potentiality that this constituting loss harbors "so [Foucault] turns to
confession to show how the subject must relinquish itself in and through the manifestation of the self it
constructs. In this sense, the manifestation of the self dissolves its interiority and reconstitutes it in its
externality" (113). This was, ultimately, the aim of the Foucauldian investigation that began round the
year 1980; that is, trying to comprehend the shift inferred by the Christian practices of the self and the
way in which these practices become the institutional normality under what today constitutes the
contemporary subjects.
According to Casiano in Institutions cénobitiques “the Christian self-examination is no longer applied
to the acts, as was the case in ancient Greek Roman history, but rather to a ‘previous’ command which
– and this is a radical innovation – is constituted as a ‘field of objective data that requires interpretation’”
(Foucault, El origen 29), the “control of thoughts” and “the revelation of the truth about oneself can
never be separated from the obligation of sacrificing the self” (31). In other words, for Foucault, Western
subjectivity can be traced back to a movement of self-resignation, of loss, of subjection. During the
seminar in Berkeley, Foucault asks: “What is this obligation of truth-telling in relation to oneself that
was imposed on everyone including mad people, if they want to become reasonable and normal?” (40).
Having analyzed Butler’s focus, we have reformulated the question: In what way were the practices of
alethurgy instated in the West as a sine qua non condition in order to generate recognition of part of
the regime of truth? We believe that this reformulated question can act as a fundamental nucleus in
both the latest of Butler and Foucault’s works, considering that for Foucault "this project strives to reveal
the moment in which such practices become coherent and reflexive techniques with defined objectives,
the moment in which a particular discourse breaks away from the techniques and ends up being accepted
as true, the moment in which the practices are bound to the obligation of searching for the truth and
telling the truth" (43).
We can therefore appreciate two truths in Foucault; the truth as a force developed in the Greek Latin
culture, and the truth as a regime, consolidated throughout the first two centuries of Christianity. In
Berkeley, Foucault precisely described this form of truth which is brought about, or is expressed as a
force on describing the advice that Seneca offered his disciple Sereno: "This addition to the already
known is not knowledge, it is a force; a force capable of transforming pure knowledge and simple
consciousness into a true way of life” (El origen 55). In the Greek Latin period, we discover a type of
subject that experiences the truth, not by discovering it in oneself, but rather by practicing it, and
constituting it (56). For their part, the Christian practices of the self instigate a hermeneutic process
that seeks to reveal the darkest secrets of subjectivity. There is no will for the truth, but rather decoding
of the truth. For Foucault, in this very instance, we are dealing with an inedited from, one of extraction.
And yet, it is in this extraction carried out by the Christian practices of the self that establish, as it
were, modern subjectivity, that Butler finds a place for expression; an extraction that demonstrates
itself, and which is executed through exomologesis, by means of a corporal performative act that puts
the extracted truth in action. Therefore, by “reconsideration” Butler means jeopardizing the intelligibility
and challenging the social convention based, precisely, on this ecstatic movement, "one that moves me
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outside of myself into a sphere in which I am dispossessed of myself and constituted as a subject at the
same time" (Giving an account 115). What's more, Butler adds, "The sinner does not have to give an
account that corresponds to events but only make himself manifest as a sinner. Thus a certain
performative production of the subject within established public conventions is required of the confessing
subject and constitutes the aim of confession itself” (113).
In the performativity that puts its body into action, in the practice of exomologesis, as previously
mentioned, “the manifestation of the self dissolves its inwardness and reconstitutes it in its externality”
(113). This practice of exomologesis is always external to the subject, it is always expressed for the
behalf of someone else, in front of someone else; we could say it becomes public. As we move forward,
such exteriority, and making ourselves public, puts us at risk and puts our recognition at risk, and makes
us vulnerable much like interdependent subjects and subjects relationally constituted. We might say,
we share “a plural bodily life” (Dispossession 196), a "plural performativity" (175), and we find that our
bodies are, precisely, "a turbulent performative occasion" (178). So, if we understand precariousness
as Butler does, the only way to prevent the risk of the loss of recognition resulting from constituting
oneself externally for the first time, is by constituting oneself in a way that collectively involves others,
through whom, the subject sees themself constituted, understanding the role of the body as plural
practice. This plural practice does not fall on deaf ears, it is constituted as living memory. In order to
give an example of this body composed of common memory, Butler draws attention to the Guatemalan
performer Regina José Galindo and her piece Quién puede borrar las huellas:
In that most impressive piece of 2003, Galindo protested the decision of the Guatemalan Supreme Court to
allow the presidential candidacy of Efraín Ríoss Montt, a former member of the military junta known for his
participation in political murders. The piece commences with Galindo in a black dress carrying a white basin
filled with blood through the streets of Guatemala City. She occasionally sets the basin down, dips her feet in
the blood, drawing the attention of pedestrians, and then continues her processional leaving the traces of
blood as she goes. The walk ends at the steps of the National Palace, the site where the military dictators
ruled, where, confronted by a police line blocking entry into the building, she sets down the basin in front of
them, dips her feet for the last time, and leaves them face to face with two bold footprints of blood (169).

In this type of political regime there is an institutional regulation of the truth, as is the case of postwar Guatemala. During this regime, Galindo unleashed a new reconciliation with the truth, which the
governing regime of truth intended to be forgotten. The example of Galindo’s performative power of
representation acts collectively, externalizing the truth through use of the body and recovering the
power of the representation of public pain. It is not about a sobering thought for the rest “who don’t
know,” but rather an incarnation of the victims through memory, a way of sharing a knowledge that
gives rise to a new form of intelligibility towards what is real, what is political. With Galindo, we can
observe how Butler’s model of public appearance, and in her performative thought, that contemplates
the body as "a memory come alive" (172) is reminiscent of the Christian exomologesis: "the body
suffers, falls, and is constrained and overwhelmed by external force, the performing body also persists,
survives, showing and enacting a social history, memorializing those forms of suffering and loss against
the lure of forgetfulness" (170). The exomologetic practice invades the regime of truth, deconstructing
it and allowing access to a truth that the regime continues to deny, just like the case of Guatemala’s
historical memory of the military dictatorship. The truth is externalized in the body.
Performative externalization or revelation is expressed intensely according to our author in the figure
of the controversial assembly, which she dedicates one of her most recent works to. With Notes Toward
a Performative Theory of Assembly (2015), Butler wishes to express a theory of the political body that
merges with the category of the vulnerable body. For Butler, there is no escape from vulnerability that
implies appearance in the world and thus "it is not altogether right to conceive of individual bodies as
completely distinct from one another" (130) and "The conditions of support for the most vulnerable
moments of life are themselves vulnerable" (131). For this reason, she considers that the vulnerability
of the body is what transforms it into “the means and ends of politics” (129), given that it is the
characteristic that leads us to engage with what is beyond us, "it is opening ourselves up when faced
with the body of another" (149). It is what makes us interdependent on each other. As a result, "Each
'I' brings with it the 'we' (51). Throughout the development of Notes Toward a Performative Theory of
Assembly we can observe how Butler returns to the Foucauldian concept of “regimes of truth” in order
to refer to the appearance frameworks of the social movements in which, according to Butler, the
collective subject is materialized in a more dynamic way. As in Giving an account, the use of Foucauldian
terminology stems from an interest in the appearance and performance of the body in the framework
or regime as a constructor of subjectivity; in other words, an interest in performativity of the body in
an exomologetic sense.
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On the other hand, Butler’s critique of Giorgio Agamben's “bare life” concept demonstrates the
dispossession’s necessary double movement and foreclosure of any political agency: "Are we going to
say that those who are excluded are simply unreal, disappeared, or that they have no being at all? Are
they mere life or bare life? [...] If we do that, we not only adopt the position of a particular regime of
appearance but ratify that perspective" (Notes 78). The conception of human life as “bare life” would
ultimately deny these subjects’ capacity to congregate and resist and, therefore, to access a new space
of revelation from which new frames of recognition are possible. If this were not the case, how could
we realize or recognize the forms of agency and resistance of the dispossessed? The dispossessed
subject, far from being a “bare life,” and being outside of the political sphere, is the one who is aware
of and affirms the different social ties they are constituted of, who knows themself to be vulnerable and
who, on becoming aware of themself, searches within ‘us’ for what they have been dispossessed of. Far
from being a mere existence, normally it is “angered, indignant, rising up, and resisting" life (80), that
is collectivized and searches for "ways of caring for one another or establishing networks of support"
(80) in the rest of the dispossessed. They are not the same, nor should we confuse the bare life or life
without agency with the precariousness that life implicitly entails and the dependency that derives from
this. It is the framework of intelligibility that dictates the extent of precariousness a life can reach. Thus
if "precariousness implies living socially" (Frames 14), and if "survival is dependent on what we might
call a social network of hands" (14), it is the understanding of precariousness that offers the first
framework open to the possibility of a collective subject. The fact that a life finds itself in a situation of
extreme precariousness, does not mean that it has become a bare life, removed from history and with
no possibility of escape or change. What it does mean, however, is that the life must reclaim the
conditions that make it “livable.” Such a claim constitutes political and ethical responsibility that, for
Butler, can only be undertaken collectively.
Lastly, we cannot fail to mention that the influence of the philosopher Etienne Balibar, in paricular
his notion of citoyenneté imparfaite (imperfect citizenship), which echoes in the Butlerian proposal of
the assembly as a deconstruction of institutional recognition. An “imperfect citizenship,” in the words of
Balibar, is defined by the extent to which it is and will be in permanent reformation. The institutionalized
citizenship is thus faced with a threat which implies the very potential of the power of which it is formed,
"the 'insurrectional' power of political movements that aim to conquer rights that do not yet exist"
(Balibar, Citizenship 37). Butler goes on to analyze the forms of revelation of this ‘us’, conscious of its
interdependence since the assented political protests in the assemblies. For Butler, the assemblies
represent said "plural and public action is the exercise of the right to place and belonging to the
community” (Notes 59-60). Based on the exercise of this right, the “us” is creating the right to an
appearance that was otherwise denied. Butler always considers this invasion in the right for appearance
in relation to the body "when the body 'speaks' politically" she says, "it is not only in vocal or written
language" (83), but in its own exhibition, it implies a rupture of the regime of legitimate appearance,
and the body will do so through a specific performativity. Shared body language, literal physical union
in the protest of holding hands, embracing or being knocked down or beaten etc. are among the physical
practices that Butler through exomologesis. For her, such practices put a new regime of truth into action
before the demand for recognition and dispute existing forms of political legitimacy from the scene of
truth.
Through this vindication of the appearance of the assembly in the public space as a performative
exercise of recognition, Butler, via Foucauldian self-constitution, invests in a subject that, rather than
express or manifest “I am, I see, I do,” instead expresses an ‘us’ that, in common, refutes and voids
the previously existing forms of political legitimacy. If indeed Foucault considers the constituting
Christian loss as a regression that impedes or hinders agency, the process which Butler will follow by
means of dispossession would involve returning agency to this constituting loss from which we can no
longer detach ourselves. And this takes places because the loss is precisely what constitutes the subject
with another, toward another, externally to themself. The controversial assembly, the protest in the
street whereby we are subjugated and submitted, is the constitutive space where we are conscious of
dispossession, of the constitutive loss which, when with others both implicates and imposes. Butler
proposes an ethical agency project of ‘my body’ and the body of others, whose objective will be the
conformation of a co-responsible, collective movement that, with its common performative presence in
the public space, shapes the yearning collective subject. However, in honor of the Foucauldian critique,
Butler finds one of the tools that would enable the conformation of a collective and controversial subject.
The critique is "a means for a future or a truth that it will not know nor happen to be, it oversees a
domain it would not want to police and is unable to regulate" (Judith Butler Reader, 308).
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